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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
Labor migration from East to West in the context of European integration 
and changing socio-political borders 
 
 
 
Labor migration from Eastern Europe and the member countries of 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the Western countries became 
an important socio-economic issue. Since political systems and the nature of 
border management in these regions, migrations turned out to be a very 
complex and unpredictable issue. The purpose of this study is to analyze the 
region specific factors, practices and policies of migration in the Eastern 
countries, the possible scenarios and demographic consequences of the future 
migration flows. In order to address this issue properly, some of the 
complexities of labor migration phenomenon in the region are uncovered.  
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Abstract 
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(CIS) to the Western countries became an important socio-economic issue. Since political systems and the 
nature of border management in these regions, migrations turned out to be a very complex and 
unpredictable issue. The purpose of this study is to analyze the region specific factors, practices and 
policies of migration in the Eastern countries, the possible scenarios and demographic consequences of 
the future migration flows. In order to address this issue properly, some of the complexities of labor 
migration phenomenon in the region are uncovered.  
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1. Introduction  
Migration issues and associated policies have become a very important socio-economic issue 
during the last two decades or so given the increased number of emigrants coming from the member 
countries of Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) to the western countries. This grows the concern of 
policy-makers in both migrant sending and receiving countries that the size of migration flows could be 
very large in the future. According to various estimations, the future migration potential from the CIS to 
West is calculated approximately at 13.5 mln. for the horizon from 2000 to 2050 (Mansoor and Quillin 
2007). While these estimations are based on demographic and economic factors, which are undoubtedly 
very important in determining migration flows, the complexity of the issue that stems from various 
problems related to migration (e.g. irregular migration, trafficking in people, and changing borders) 
requires, in addition, a careful consideration of cultural, public and political aspects of migrants’ lives.  
Studies focused on the post-Soviet countries distinguish ethnicity, quality of life, population 
composition and economic factors as the important determinants of migration (e.g Fassmann and Munz 
1994, Cao 1999). For example, population composition and the quality of life are distinguished to be the 
important determinants of migration within these countries (e.g. out-migration from the North and East 
part of Russia),  while ethnic aspects are stressed to be the main force for migration between the countries 
(e.g. “non-ethnic” nationalities emigrate mostly from newly formed states). One should remark also that 
earlier work downplayed the impact of traditional labor market factors (e.g. wage and employment levels) 
on immigration flows in the CIS, claiming that under the prevalence of wage arrears and extensive 
barters, its standard market signals did not operate (e.g. Cao 1999). Later studies, on the contrary, argued 
that the labor market variables considered in the neoclassical approach shall operate in the post-Soviet 
countries exactly as theory predicts (Andrienko and Guriev 2004).  
The main purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the determinants of migration flows 
in the CIS taking into account its region specific factors and, based on this, develop the possible scenarios 
of future migration flows for three regional parts, including: Russia and the European part of CIS, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. In particular, the main driving forces of the past and recent migration trends 
are analyzed focusing on large migration waves, which took place from the former Soviet Union (SU) 
prior to 1990 and the CIS after 1990, and their main features. Then, the potential sizes of emigration 
flows under three possible scenarios are proposed. In analyzing the migration flows, uncertainty issues 
and policies implemented by the major receiving countries within the CIS are taken into account, apart 
from traditional labor market factors. The next section provides a brief survey of migration theories, their 
empirical relevance and stylized facts on the CIS countries. Section 3 describes backgrounds for large 
migration flows as well as recent migration trends in the region. The main determinants of migration are 
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discussed in Section 4 and the possible scenarios of future migration flows are provided in Section 5. 
Section 6 evaluates the demographic consequences of migration for some selected CIS countries and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical background  
A traditional neoclassical approach assumes that migrants choose locations based on current and 
expected income differentials. These stem from varying economic and employment opportunities across 
countries where migration is considered an investment decision of rational agents whose overall gains 
from migration exceed the moving costs (e.g. Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969).  The probability of migration, 
consequently, is expected to increase with wage and welfare gains and decrease with the rise of 
unemployment rates. Moreover, various permanent and transitory shocks, which differ in their persistence 
and predictability, influence migration through changes in labor supply. Most empirical studies, which are 
based on the traditional theories of migration (e.g. Pissarides and McMaster 1990; Greenwood et al. 1991; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991), analyze the relationship between current net migration and various labor 
market and non-market variables using, typically, aggregated data. Important labor market variables in 
these studies are wage and unemployment rate. Non labor market factors are controlled usually by a wide 
range of variables including, for example, geographic distance, satisfaction with the location of origin, 
attachment to local labor markets, institutional and legal aspects, family ties, customs and cultural 
differences between immigrants and natives (Enchautegui 1997, Konya 2007, Lazear 1999, Fertig and 
Schmidt 2000).  
Many of the above-mentioned empirical studies, as mentioned by Gallin (2004), ignore the 
forward looking nature of migration, even though this nature is crucially important in the theoretical 
models. Specifically, Gallin argues that the estimated effect of the current variables on net migration can 
be largely biased due to identification problems, if the forward looking nature of migration decision is 
ignored, as is the case in many empirical studies. Recent studies in this area, which are known as “the new 
economics of labor migration”, add new dimension of labor migration. Namely, market uncertainty and 
risks in family migration decisions are incorporated to the above-mentioned traditional models (Chen et 
al. 2003, Stark 1991). Focusing on a collective and interdependent decision-making, the authors 
emphasize household families as an important decision-making unit in which a migration choice stems 
from the risk diversification strategies of families. Collective migration decisions result in remittances 
from migrants to their families in their home countries. In this respect, income risks or income correlation 
between countries and regions are found to be key determinants of family migration decisions since 
negative correlation reduces the overall risk and strengthen incentives to migrate (Chen et al. 2003). 
Based on a comprehensive analysis of family migration in the framework of utility maximization with 
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heterogeneous members, the authors argue that members with high earning potential abroad migrate even 
if they earn less and income risks are high in a foreign country. Thus, under the assumption of risk 
uncertainty, migration doesn’t flow automatically in response to wage differentials, but it also depends on 
certain risks (country risks, economic and political uncertainty, migrations cost), which vary across 
countries, and market correlations between home and foreign countries.        
Empirical studies covering the main determinants and future potential of migration flows between 
and within the  CIS countries include Memedovic et al. (1995), Fertig (1999), Weiss et al. (2003),  
Andrienko and Guriev (2004), Patzwaldt (2004) and Rios (2006). Uncertainty and risk factors, which are 
important determinants of migration, are not, however, considered in these studies. Bauer and 
Zimmerman (in Memedovic et al. 1995), for instance, analyze the welfare implications of labor migration 
from the least developed countries to Western Europe. The authors investigate empirically the structure of 
population and demographic trends for Europe and the least developed countries and outline two 
important facts. First, there is a stagnating and ageing population in the European Union (EU), while in 
the least developed countries there is noticeable population growth. Second, there is no statistical 
relationship between migration and the level of unemployment in the receiving EU member states. 
Incorporating these assumptions into a formal model of migration, they provide a scenario in which 
migration flows to Europe from the least developed countries will be concentrated among low-skilled 
workers. The present study attempts to empirically investigate the determinants of migration flows in the 
CIS, taking into account uncertainty issues and policies implemented by the major, migrant receiving 
countries, apart from traditional factors described in the above-mentioned studies. Specifically, the main 
factors and origins of migration, as well as the groups of migrants under the past migration flows are 
analyzed. Based on these, three possible scenarios of migration flows within and from the region are 
proposed.  
3. Earlier and recent migration in the CIS  
In order to understand better reasons for migration flows in the CIS, one needs to examine the 
historical origins of these flows. Migration flows can be traced back to the 19th century when Russian 
territorial borders sharply extended towards Caucasus and Central Asia. In this period, the former Russian 
Empire initiated substantial reforms in education, the government, the judiciary and military under the 
rule of Alexander II. Among these reforms were military expansion and agricultural colonization. 
Following the Crimean War, Russian troops first gained control of the Caucasus region, where they faced 
revolts of Muslim tribes under the leadership of the Chechen rebel, Shamil.1  After capturing him in 1859, 
the army expanded into Central Asia. By 1868 Russian forces had occupied the territory of Turkestan, the 
                                                 
1This example demonstrates that some of the ethnic conflicts in the CIS have very old roots going back to earlier 
centuries. 
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capital of which was Tashkent (the capital of present Uzbekistan), and the Samarqand area. Later, in the 
1870s, Russian troops incorporated the remaining Central Asian emirates into the empire and in 1881 the 
Turkmen lands on the Persian and Afghan border were occupied.  
 In the 20th century, the territory of the former Russian Empire was expanded further. Between 
1920 and 1945, new regions (e.g. the former Bukhara and Khiva Emirates,2 Western Ukraine, Western 
Byelorussia, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the Baltic States, Tuva and Konigsberg [i.e. Kaliningrad]) 
were included. Migration in these regions as well as other economic and geographic peripheries of the 
former Empire was intensified by urbanization, which occurred first within Russia and Ukraine between 
1917 and 1941. After the World War II, it spread to other regions including Belarus, Moldova, Central 
Asia and several eastern autonomous republics of Russia3. With the goal to urbanize and develop virgin 
lands with rich natural resources, the authorities of the former SU were intensively moving citizens from 
the European regions towards East, North-East and South. Very often aggressive campaigns were used 
against population. As reported in Pockney (1991), for example, many civilians were taken forcibly from 
their homelands and scattered to newly incorporated territories in the eastern and southern regions of the 
former SU during the state-building process.  
The state-building process of the former SU, therefore, was accompanied by massive population 
flows including forced, state-organized and voluntary movement. There is not much written about these in 
the economic literature so far. The primary reason for this is that migration issues generally were not a 
popular area of research in the former SU since economic activity and labor force distribution within the 
country were planned and controlled by the state. Yet, there were a few attempts to analyze the concepts 
of population mobility restrictions and migration flows both before and after the collapse (e.g. Santalov 
and Segal 1927; Lewis and Rowland 1979). According to these studies, there were several large waves of 
migration flows in the former SU. The first wave took place between 1917 and 1938. Santalov and Segal 
(1927) report that about 23.8% of population in the former Russian Empire left the country immediately 
after the red revolution of 1917. During the following years, i.e. between 1921 and 1933, which are 
marked as the period of severe famine in the history of SU, about 4-5.5 mln. emigrated (Pockney 1991). 
Emigration was almost impossible between 1937 and 1941, but there was an unprecedented ethnic 
migration within the country, primarily, from the European part towards East and South. This was caused 
partly by the collectivization policies of the early 1930s, which generated large losses for agricultural 
settlers pushing them out of their settlements, as well as repressions largely victimizing intellectual elites 
                                                 
2The Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanat, which were located in Central Asia, were included to the former SU in 
1920 as parts of present Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.  
3The SU experienced significant city growth from the 1940s through the 1980s with one of the fastest rate of 
urbanization in the world (Gang and Stuart 1998). 
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in the late of the 1930s. People were moving massively within the country through state-organized as well 
as private ethnic migration. 
After World War II, the second large wave of emigration flew when about 8-10 mln. left the 
country, then the long period of the “iron curtains” followed. From the 1950s to the 1970s emigration was 
almost impossible. Table 1 demonstrates the structure of population by ethnic groups during the period 
from 1959 to 2002 when there was a large fall in the number of a few ethnic groups (e.g. Jews, Germans 
and Poles) during the 1970s. According to Fassmann and Munz (1994), this was the result of eased 
restrictions in the emigration policy of the former SU under the pressure of the United States (US) and 
Western Europe. The third wave of large emigrations started in 1988 when legislation allowing all 
citizens of the former SU to travel abroad by private invitation was put in force.4 Immediately after 
enacting this law, emigration increased by 2.5 times in 1988 compared to 1987. It mainly consisted of 
representatives of national groups, most of which were returning to their historical homelands or joining 
powerful foreign diaspora (Fassmann and Munz 1994). According to Fassmann and Munz (1994), about 
half of these emigrants were ethnic Jews, almost all of whom went to Israel or US.5 More than a third of 
emigrants were ethnic Germans whose emigration was supported by the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Thus, a variety of factors motivated these emigrants to leave the country. These included economic, 
political, ethno-cultural and religious reasons, but all emigrants had one thing in common: politically 
powerful bridgeheads abroad.  
The overview of emigration flows that took place in recent years shows that migration was 
limited geographically. The main source countries of emigration to the Western Europe, for example, 
were Russia and the European part of the CIS (84%) including Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Mostly, 
ethnic Jews emigrated from these countries, which caused a decrease in their total number by 76% 
between 1989 and 2002 in the CIS. During the same period, the number of ethnic Germans decreased by 
about 50%, most of whom emigrated from Central Asia. Further evidence suggests that the largest part of 
CIS emigrants was from capitals and large cities. About 40% of emigrants from Russia previously resided 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, emigrants from Ukraine were inhabitants of Kiev and Odessa, people from 
Belarus used to live previously in Minsk and the Gomel province, and those from Kazakhstan came from 
Alma-Ata and Karaganda province.  
Ethnic factors played an important role not only in external, but also in internal migration flows 
in the CIS. So far, two main trends of such migration flows have been observed. The first is the migration 
of those ethnic groups to the states in which they form a titular nation, referred as return migration. The 
second trend is migration to Russia by the members of ethnic Russians and all nationalities assimilated to 
                                                 
4 This legislation was enforced under political and economic pressure at the international level.  
5The anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that many of these “Jews” had no background in the religion, but 
declared so in order to emigrate.  
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Russian culture (e.g. Locher 2002). One has to remark, however, that the return migration of ethnic 
Russians from the other SU republics started in the 1970s, before the break-up of the SU. Table 2 
demonstrates that the process of ousting Russians began in the Caucasian republics in the 1960s when the 
share of ethnic Russians in the total population decreased e.g. by 2 and 4 percentage points in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, respectively. While the Russian population was already decreasing in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus during the 1980s, immigration into the European part of the former SU, especially, to Ukraine, 
Belarus, Estonia and Latvia continued by ethnic Russians. In recent years, the pace of this process has 
been intensified by the social and political development following the collapse of the SU. With the 
transformation of the SU to the CIS, about 73 mln. altogether became the members of new ethnic groups. 
The largest fraction were ethnic Russian (26 mln.) living outside Russia. So, a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the CIS is an increase in the number of ethnic Russian refugees and accompanying groups 
(e.g. Russian speaking small ethnicities) due to ethnic and religious conflicts in the CIS.6  These conflicts 
arose in various controversies over political power, ownership, and citizenship due in many cases to a 
revival of nationalism. For these reasons, voluntary or forced migration to Russia was large during the 
period from 1992 to 2005 (Table 2).  
Table 3 demonstrates that the inflow of migrants to Russia from other CIS states is large, with net 
immigration roughly equal to 4.8 mln. between 1990 and 2005. About 35% of these people left 
Kazakhstan, 24% are from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 16% - from Georgia and Azerbaijan, and 8% - 
from Ukraine. Table 4 further indicates that refugees were departing mostly during violent ethnic 
conflicts and also from those states where ethnic Russians are either few in numbers (e.g. Georgia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) or dispersed over large areas (Kazakhstan). This implies that one of the main 
factors pushing emigration is political instability and ethnic tensions forcing various ethnic and religious 
groups to flee. Another reason is the fact that in these newly established states, domestic policies were 
suddenly changed in order to quickly revive their own culture and languages. For example, Russian is no 
longer the official language in these countries and knowing the language of a titular nation is a necessary 
condition for many jobs. Consequently, ethnic Russians and many other small ethnicities assimilated to 
Russian culture and language are willing to emigrate.7 For historical reasons the main destination for 
these refugees and emigrants is Russia. According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, for example, 
the inflow of both regular and irregular migrants to the country has substantially increased recently. The 
number of work permits issued to foreign citizens rose from 129 thousand to 670 thousand between 1994 
and 2005. The number of irregular migrants is much larger, but not precise, estimates are ranging from 5 
                                                 
6The example of these conflicts includes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbajan, conflicts between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks in Osh region in Kyrgyzstan, between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, 
between Chechens and Ingushis in the Northern Caucasus, and the civil war in Moldova and Georgia. 
7According to a field survey of 945 ethnic migrants conducted by the Center of Demography and Human Ecology of 
the Institute for Employment Studies in the beginning of the 1990s, 27% of them would like to emigrate. 
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to 10 mln. during this period (Voronina in Rios 2006). Key migration trends have taken place recently are 
briefly overviewed below by three regions, the CIS  European part, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.  
 
a) The European part of the CIS 
The CIS European part is identified in this study as Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine with a 
total population of about 203 mln. people. The discussion above suggests that Russia is in the core of 
migration issues in the CIS, receiving as well as sending the large number of migrants. According to the 
State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics (SCRFS), about 4.8 mln. emigrated from Russia 
during the period from 1990 to 2005. The majority of these people left for other CIS states (78%), 
including Ukraine (33.9%), Kazakhstan (13.6%), Belarus (8.1%) and Uzbekistan (3.8%).  Among the rest 
of the countries, Germany (16.1%) and Israel (5.5%) are the largest receivers of migrants from Russia. As 
for the number of immigrants during this period, SCRFS reports that approximately 8.7 mln. people 
came, most of whom left Kazakhstan (27.2%), Ukraine (23.2%), Uzbekistan (11.1%), the Caucasus 
(14.3%), other CIS countries (19.7%), and the rest of the world (4.5%). One has to remark that a key 
concern for Russia is the large size of irregular immigration from its neighboring states. According to 
International Organization for Migration (IOM),8 for example, the official estimates of irregular 
immigrants residing permanently in the Russian Federation in 2005 ranged from 3 to 5 mln. people, while 
the number of Russian citizens working abroad at both regular and irregular basis was in the range 
between 500 thous. to 1.5 mln. Moreover, about 12 to 15 mln. immigrants visit Russia every year for 
seasonal work, however, the number of work permits obtained for foreigners by Russian employers 
annually is much fewer (300 thous.). Consequently, the majority of foreigners work illegally in Russia, 
mainly in the shadow and informal structures of the economy (ILO 2005).  
Ukraine is the second largest country in the region with a population of about 47 mln. The 
number of emigrants living abroad is also large. For example, the size of the Ukrainian diaspora in the 
West was estimated at 3 mln. prior to 1989. During the period from 1991 to 2004, about 4.5 mln. left 
mostly for US, Canada, Argentina and Europe, while the number of immigrants coming permanently 
from other CIS states to the Ukraine has been estimated to be about 2 mln. (Rios 2006). So, between 1989 
and 2005, population of Ukraine dropped by 4.6 mln. due to large net migration outflows as well as 
falling birth rates with the lowest rate of natural increase in the world  (-0.8%). Because of a large number 
of Ukrainian emigrants leaving for abroad, the government of Ukraine has recently signed a number of 
bilateral labor agreements with a purpose of simplifying employment procedures for Ukrainian workers 
and protecting their rights.9 For example, an agreement on temporary labor migration has been signed 
                                                 
8See e.g. International Organization for Migration (2005): Russian Federation, “Facts and Figures”.  
9The list of these countries includes  Belarus, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
and Slovakia. 
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with Portugal where Ukrainians form about 2% of its inhabitants. In 2005, Italy granted legal status to 
about 100 thous. workers coming from Ukraine. The EU and Switzerland announced that visa regimes for 
Ukrainian workers will be eased. These agreements can increase the migration outflows. According to 
Cipko (in Rios 2006), however, relatively well educated Ukrainian citizens living in these and other 
European countries are mostly engaged in sectors with low-skill requirements such as, for example, 
agriculture (harvesting fruits and vegetables), construction, care taking (taking care of seniors, children 
and sick) and service (hotels, cafeterias, restaurants, nightclubs). Therefore, the large outflow of 
professionals as well as a sharp fall in country’s population increased the importance of domestic policies 
towards return migration. This will presumably determine to a certain extent the future prospects for 
migration flows from the country, along with the speed of political and economic reforms in Ukraine. 
Evidence suggests also that Ukraine is one of the origin countries in Europe for trafficking in human 
beings for prostitution, labor and domestic servitude for Western Europe, Turkey and Russia (IOM 2005). 
This creates a major migration and human rights challenge for the country. 
Widespread poverty with about 64.7% of population living below the poverty line and the lack of 
job opportunities caused many Moldavians, estimated at about 408 thous. by 2005 (IOM 2005), to 
emigrate abroad, mostly illegally. In addition, Moldova has, by far, the greatest number of victims of 
trafficking in the region (IOM). The government attempts, in this respect, to improve migration 
management through accessing the impact of migration, ensuring protection of migrants’ rights and 
preventing trafficking in persons. In Belarus, the number of emigrants is estimated at about 1.2 mln. 
people (or 12.2% of population) since the beginning of the 1990s.  As in other CIS countries, preventing 
trafficking in people, especially young women, to the EU countries, Russia, Middle East and South-East 
Asia is considered a major challenge for Belarus. According to IOM, the government of Belarus 
demonstrated its commitment and made visible efforts to counteract illegal migration, trafficking in 
human beings, and related crime, however, the capacity of the country alone in responding these difficult 
challenges is limited. In this respect, in partnership with government institutions, international and 
nongovernmental organizations, IOM works to address the main migration priorities in line with the state 
migration programme set for 2006-2010. IOM applies a regional programmatic approach to enhance the 
capacity of the Belarusian government to improve border management, fight illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings, promote cross-border cooperation and develop legal migration opportunities. 
 
b) Caucasus 
The Caucasian countries, with a total population of 16 mln. people, experienced difficult state 
building processes in the 1990s, accompanied by natural and human disasters with devastating effects on 
their economies. As a result, various ethnic and socio-economic tensions became a push factor for many 
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emigrants. Between 1988 and 2005, for example, between 0.9 mln. and 1 mln. people permanently left 
Armenia (Yeganyan in Rios  2006), while about 2 mln. and 1.9 mln. emigrated from Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, correspondingly. The estimated potential of emigration from the region (0.8-1.5 mln.) suggests 
that migration flows will continue for some time (Yeganyan 2004, IOM 2006). The main factors for this 
are social and economic conditions in the region which are enhanced, in addition, by migrant community 
networks established abroad (e.g. a large Armenian diaspora of more than 10 mln.). Among the Caucasian 
countries, Azerbaijan is recognized to be a leading exporter of labor to the CIS. About 2 mln. 
Azerbaijanis are identified labor migrants, 75% of whom live in the capital and major cities of Russia.10  
The main migration challenges in the region, apart from high migration flows abroad, are transit 
migration originating from Central Asia and the Middle East, trafficking in people and associated border 
control issues. According to IOM (2005), all three countries face an important challenge to prevent 
smugglers and irregular migrants from using the region as a transit corridor to Russia and Western 
Europe. In this respect, various technical assistance programs financed by international and donor 
institutions are focused on promoting legal migration. These include national capacity building and inter-
regional dialogue between the South Caucasus and the EU on preventing irregular migration, enforcing 
legislation on cross-border transfers, upgrading the border management system, trainings in investigating 
the cases of trafficking in people, assisting in the voluntary return of migrants to the region, etc. (IOM 
2005).11  
 
c) Central Asia 
The Central Asian part of the CIS, with a total population of 58 mln. people, largely diverged in 
terms of main economic and social indicators after the break-up of the SU. Due to dynamic economic 
development and relatively high wages,12 Kazakhstan, for example, became a major destination for labor 
migrants in the region. Two types of labor migration are distinguished within the region: immigration for 
seasonal work, with about one million illegal migrants coming every year from the poorer neighboring 
countries, and illegal migrants that prefer to use Kazakhstan as a transit country for moving to Russia and 
Europe. The second category includes immigrants from the Central Asian region as well as Eastern 
Russia, China, Turkey and Afghanistan. Irregular immigrants are estimated to compose 80% of all 
immigrants in the country (Bulekbaev in Rios 2006). In this respect, policies towards legalizing illegal 
                                                 
10During the period from 1989 to 2005, for example, the number of ethnic Azerbaijanis residing in the capital city of 
Russia increased by 4.6 times. 
11International and donor institutions assisting the governments of the countries in the region include, for example, 
the governments of US and Canada, EU, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, World Food Programme,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
12A minimal threshold of wages in Kazakhstan was 250 USD while the average salary in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
was about 60 USD in 2005.  
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labor migration were introduced with the purpose to increase budget revenues through the taxation of 
currently unregistered labor migrants, ensure their right and social protection, and eventually decrease 
illegal labor migration. As a result, the number of officially hired foreign workers has increased from 10.7 
thous. in 2001 to 24.8 thous. in 2005. According to Bulekbaev (in Rios 2006), the majority of foreign 
workers were employed in the Atyrau region (32.6%), where concentrated the oil refining and producing 
branches of the Kazakh economy, as well as in the current (15.4%) and previous (8.4%) capital cities.13 
At the same time, the Kazakh government set annual quotas for foreign specialists in each industrial 
sector in order to protect the national labor markets.14  
While many ethnic Russians and Germans have left Kazakhstan, over 300 thous. ethnic Kazakhs 
have returned since independence. This was enhanced for some extent by the Kazakh government that 
established special quotas for ethnic Kazakhs (or “oralmans”) coming from Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Mongolia. These immigrants were supported by the state both in housing and work. 
For example, about 99.7% of budgeted allowance was assigned to these immigrants in 2004 (Bulekbaev 
in Rios 2006) which contributed for some extent to a balanced net migration in 2005, after the net out-
migration pronounced in the early and mid-1990s. At the same time, growing salaries and demand for 
workers attracted labor migrants from the neighboring countries in Central Asia. Due to a restricted legal 
employment framework, however, still most labor migrants work irregularly. In mid-2006, the 
government developed regularization for certain categories of labor migrants. This initiative, however, 
has not brought yet legal status and protection to the majority of labor migrants in Kazakhstan.  
Other countries in the region - Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - are 
primarily sending countries. Various social studies (e.g. IOM 2005, Rios 2006) indicate that external 
migration from these countries amounted to 2-3 mln. during the period from 1995 to 2005. While most of 
these people went to Russia and Kazakhstan, some emigrated to Turkey, the UAE, Iran and Arab 
countries with which Central Asia established various social networks through shuttle trade at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Some countries in the region (e.g. Turkmenistan) became transit countries for 
Afghans going to Russia and then to the West. As for the future potential of external migration, social 
surveys conducted in the region suggest that about 12% of the population, on average intends to emigrate 
abroad (e.g. Rios 2006). The largest share of potential emigrants is from the middle-income group, with a 
primary reason for their wish to emigrate being the lack of appropriate work in the region. Most of the 
potential external migrants, roughly 50-60%, would like to go to Russia, 10-15% to Kazakhstan, and the 
rest of the respondents to other foreign countries including Turkey, the UAE and Arab countries.  
                                                 
13 The present capital city of Kazakhstan is Astana, the previous one is Almaty. 
14 In order to strengthen migration control over the temporary stay of foreigners in Kazakhstan, special migration 
cards were introduced in 2003. The top three sectors with the highest demand for foreign labor were the construction 
(58.4%), mining (15%) and agricultural (7.8%) sectors in 2005. 
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According to IOM (2005), the regional projects financed by international donor institutions15 are 
focused on combating trafficking in people through law enforcement, prevention, protection and capacity-
building activities, promoting dialogue between the government agencies within the region on improving 
border controls, assisting voluntary return migrants, etc. Apart from these initiations, improving the 
border management and controls, first of all, at the eastern and southern boundaries of the region seems to 
be a very important challenge in the region due to the geographical position of Central Asia.16 With the 
withdrawal of the Russian forces from the borders, after the collapse of the SU, there is a substantial 
ground for increased risk factors. In particular, the borders between countries with weak governance (e.g. 
between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran, Kyrgyzstan and China) are very vulnerable 
to drug and human trafficking. For these reasons, the region is potentially attractive for smugglers and 
organized crimes as a transit corridor, traditionally, for trafficking drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and 
Europe and, more recently, for trafficking young people to the Gulf, Middle East and South-East Asia 
(see e.g. IOM 2005). Therefore, coordinated cooperation on the common border management in a close 
partnership with the neighboring countries, particularly with Russia, as well as international and inter-
governmental organizations at both regional and international levels is an important and urgent challenge 
in the region.  
4. Region and country specific factors of migration 
The discussion above suggests that socio-economic, ethnic and political factors have played an 
important role in the migratory flows from and within the CIS and suggests that these factors will also 
determine the direction, pattern and magnitude of future migration flows. In terms of economic and 
demographic factors, the CIS countries are characterized by large disparities. Table 4 demonstrates the 
selected economic and demographic indicators from the CIS countries in 2006. According to Table 4, the 
CIS countries differ greatly in terms of demographic factors in 2006. For example, the highest population 
decrease is in Ukraine (by 0.74%), while in Armenia it increased by 2.23%. Generally, the European part 
of CIS is characterized by a low ratio of children under 15 when compared to the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (Figure 1, Appendix 2). In terms of economic growth rates, Azerbaijan achieved the highest growth 
rate (34.5%) in 2006, while Kyrgyzstan grew by only 2.7%. The wealthiest country in terms of GDP per 
capita is Russia and the poorest one is Tajikistan. As shown in Figure 2 (Appendix 2), GDP growth rates 
fluctuated in a wide range, between -44.9% and 34.5%, during the period from 1989 to 2006. 
Furthermore, although prior to 2004, the countries were converging in terms of GDP growth rates, after 
this date they largely diverged. One important reason for diverging trends in the GDP growth rates was 
                                                 
15These include e.g. the Canadian government, EU, the Norwegian government, Swedish International Development 
Agency, the government of US, etc. 
16Central Asia is bordered with Russia to the north, China to the east, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south which 
makes the region very attractive for organized crimes and smugglers for trafficking people, drugs, etc.   
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political instability in a number of countries experienced revolutions between 2004 and 2005. For 
example, in the year following the rose revolution in Georgia, the growth rate of GDP declined by 6% 
compared to the previous year. In Ukraine it fell from 12.1% in 2004, the year when the country 
experienced the orange revolution, to 2.6% in 2005 and in Kyrgyzstan from 7.0% in 2004 to -0.2% in 
2005 after the tulip revolution that took place in March 2005.  
Therefore, in terms of economic differentials, there is substantial impetus for increased migration 
flows. Both housing availability and job opportunities in potential destination countries are important. At 
the same time, migrants’ ability to access information on various opportunities is also important. With 
respect to the absorptive capacity of potential destination countries (e.g. Russia and Kazakhstan), it seems 
that so far these countries are neither economically nor socially and psychologically prepared for 
receiving a large number of migrants from neighboring countries. Recent studies focused on internal labor 
migration in Russia, for example, mentioned that city restrictions, the lack of a real housing market and 
other policies undertaken by the policy-makers to curb the massive flow to major cities and regional 
centers are major obstacles in resettling immigrants (e.g. Andrienko and Guriev 2004). Therefore, many 
migrants, who left their former places of residence outside Russia lack stable accommodation in Russia. 
Given these, it can happen that potential migrants will start looking for other destinations. In many cases 
the orientation is either towards the West (e.g. ethnic Russians and other ethnicities assimilated to Russian 
culture) or countries like Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan (e.g. ethnic groups assimilated to Islam). In this 
respect, one can expect that many in similar situations in the CIS will start looking for opportunities either 
to settle in a state where their ethnic group forms a majority or to emigrate abroad. Since Russia is one of 
the largest destination as well as origin countries in the world, in terms of migration flows (Mansoor and 
Quillin 2007), the demographic and migration situation in Russia deserves a special attention.    
  The demographic situation in Russia is characterized by an imbalance of geographic distribution 
of migration flows and unequal distribution of population in terms of age structure across the regions of 
the country. Namely, the large migration of young adults from rural areas to the central and southern parts 
of the country intensified in the 1990s and has resulted in the depopulation of economically and 
geopolitically important regions like Siberia and the Far East. Moreover, according to the forecasts of 
Russian ethno-demographers, the population of the country will decline by a further 10 mln. people 
between 2006 and 2025. This will be translated to a stronger decline in working age population by more 
than 1% per year (Voronina in Rios 2006). In this respect, immigration is seen to be an important way of 
replenishing the shrinking labor force. Therefore, Russian authorities initiated reforms in migration 
policies in 2005. The policies prior 2005 can be presented in the following few stages.  
The reforms initiated during the first stage (1991-1994) included enforcing the migration laws 
and establishing the main institutions governing the development and implementation of migration laws. 
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At this stage, various funding programs were launched with the purpose to support immigrants to Russia. 
Later, between 1995 and 1999, the importance of regulations was recognized and reflected in correcting 
measures adopted at the presidential level. After 1999, key institutions responsible for migration policies 
plunged into multiple and effective reorganizations, which eventually caused the departure of qualified 
personnel and policy deterioration. Therefore, during the period from 1999 to 2002, institutions did not 
manage to resettle migrants. As a result, many immigrants who came to the big cities of Russia faced 
problems with housing, employment, etc. With a sharp increase in the various categories of migrants, 
especially irregular ones coming from the CIS as well as other regions (e.g. South-East Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East) to the big cities, the situation in the social sphere became difficult leading in many cases 
to racial intolerance and national conflicts among the population. In response, Russian authorities 
introduced various restrictions on migrants between 2002 and 2004 (Voronina in Rios 2006).  
Reforms in migration policies started in 2005 are aimed at combating irregular immigration. 
These policies include actions on liberalizing and improving the legal status of nationals coming from the 
CIS, as well as integrating immigrants into the Russian society. At the same time, strict punishment from 
smuggling and trafficking people as well as sanctions against employers hiring irregular workers are 
emphasized. Joint actions with other CIS countries include modernizing immigration control systems and 
facilitating permanent immigration to Russia. In addition, policies focused on attracting highly qualified 
specialists into Russia from the CIS as well as other countries of the world will receive high priority.  
 
5. Possible scenarios of future migration flows  
The discussion above suggests that migration pressure in the CIS countries will increase due to 
diverging demographic, economic and political situations, as well as various ethnic factors. The question 
of how large the potential migration will be is not, however, clear. Empirical studies focused on the future 
migration flows from the CIS to EU and Russia are typically based on economic and demographic factors 
(e.g. Mansoor and Quillin 2007).   For example, the net immigration flows to the EU and Russia are 
estimated at 13.5 mln. and at 5.4 mln., respectively, for the period from 2000 to 2050. The direction, 
pattern and size of migration flows from and within the CIS are determined also by many other aspects of 
migrants’ life, apart from demographic and economic differences. These are, for example, ethnic 
background, political situation and migration policies which vary from one country to another in the CIS. 
Therefore, this study attempts to take into account some of these factors and determine the possible 
scenarios for future migration flows in the CIS. Since ethnicity based migration has been one of the main 
features of migration flows during the last decades in the CIS, the scenarios of future migration flows are 
determined for two population groups separately. The first group includes nationalities which have ethnic 
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ties with other countries or large diasporas abroad. The second group includes new ethnic minorities 
which appeared after the establishment of independent CIS states.    
 
a) Emigration for ethnic reasons 
The potential emigrants of the first population category exceeded 8 mln. in the population census 
of 1989 in the entire former SU. The most numerous among them were ethnic Germans (2 mln.), Jews 
(1.5 mln.), and Poles (1.1 mln.). Other nationalities included Greeks, Koreans, Persians, Turks with the 
total number of about 3.4 mln. In the 1990s, most ethnic Germans, Jews and Poles emigrated abroad so 
that the total number of these groups decreased by more than three times in the CIS. Presumably, other 
ethnicities were leaving too. Thus, assuming that at least half of these ethnicities left the CIS, one can 
expect that the maximum potential of 8 mln. declined to about 2.9 mln. This suggests that emigration for 
ethnic reasons will eventually decrease, but not disappear completely (Fassmann and Munz 1994). Most 
likely, according to Fassmann and Munz (1994), it will be sustained by the second group, i.e. new ethnic 
minorities or potential return migrants appeared with the establishment of the CIS states. This group 
includes about 46 mln. people of various nationalities and 26 mln. ethnic Russian in the CIS. Therefore, 
all CIS countries might face an increased potential for migration flows. Namely, national and religious 
minorities dissatisfied with the domestic policies as well as their positions in the CIS states most likely 
will move. Migration of large ethnic groups, particularly Russians, who prefer to leave the CIS states with 
the new national majorities could also be large.  
The first group of potential emigrants will most likely emigrate irrespective of the socio-
economic and political situation in the CIS, if they are attracted by foreign countries. In other words, 
various shocks in the CIS members as well as immigration controls and restrictions imposed by potential 
destination countries outside the CIS can be ignored in determining the future scenarios of emigration for 
this group. Layard et al. (1992) proposes three scenarios for migration flows under the absence of shocks 
and major controls assumption. According to the first scenario, potential emigrants would move quickly 
once emigration becomes possible so that the rate of emigration flow is high initially, but later converges 
to a certain steady level. Under the second scenario, information channels available to potential emigrants 
matter because they need some time for searching various opportunities related to housing, jobs, etc. in 
destination countries. Consequently, not many emigrate at the beginning. With the development of 
information channels, however, more people would be willing to move. The third scenario combines the 
first and second ones. Under this scenario, emigration increases steadily over time until it eventually tails 
off. According to Layard et al. (1992) the third case is the most realistic one. 
The visual inspection of actual emigration flows from Russia during the period from 1985 to 
2005 suggests that the actual data approximate closely the first scenario (Figure 3, Appendix 2). Namely, 
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the largest spike of emigration took place between 1985 and 1990 only, when major controls on migration 
were removed and travel abroad by private invitations was allowed. In this respect one can expect that the 
future emigration flow of the first population group will, most likely, follow the first scenario. Therefore, 
relative changes in the number of emigrants moving abroad from Russia between 1985 and 2005 were 
used for tracing the potential emigration flow from the CIS during the same period. Then based on the 
assumption that the formation of the expected emigration flows will follow a geometric series of the past 
values,17 the potential emigration is obtained at about 1 mln. for the period from 2006 to 2025. The actual 
and forecasted values are presented in Figure 4 (Appendix 2). 
 
b) Migration of return migrants 
With respect to the second group (i.e., return migrants within the CIS), one can assume that 
migration potential will depend more on socio-economic and political situation in the CIS, as well as 
domestic policies. In particular, the situation in Russia and Kazakhstan, which are the major receivers of 
migrants among the CIS members, shall be very important. If these countries sustain a high rate of 
economic growth and implement effective reforms in their migration policies, then the large part of the 
potential migrants will most likely be absorbed by their labor markets. If conditions for accepting a 
considerable numbers of return migrants remain unfavorable, however, then most of the migrants will 
naturally consider other alternative options, i.e. countries beyond the CIS. In order to estimate what would 
be the size of potential migrants to one of these countries, Russia, a standard gravity model under the 
following specification is used under the following specification:  
 
(1) ln(Mijt)=α1+α2ln (Yjt/Yit) + α3ln(Kij)+ α4 ln(Ujt/Uit)+ α5ln(Sit)+ α6D1+ α7D2+eit. 
 
The dependent variable M in expression (1) denotes migration flows from county i to country j at time t. 
The terms Y, K, U and S denote GDP per capita, distance (in kilometers) between the capital cities of the 
countries, unemployment rates, and the stock of migrants, respectively. The first term proxies wage 
differentials between the countries. Costs associated with migration are captured with the distance 
variable. The forward looking nature of migration is controlled by the stock of migrants. The term D1 is a 
dummy variable indicating whether general economic and political situation in CIS was stable during the 
period from 1995 to 2005. The second dummy variable, D2, is a policy restriction dummy. Indexes i and j 
denote origin and destination countries such that I=1,..,11, J=118 and t stands for years such that 
                                                 
17When forming their expectations, potential emigrants give the most recent past the largest weight and that weight 
declines over time.  
18 Due to data limitations, the sample covers only one destination country (Russia).    
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T=1,...,10. The parameters to be estimated by this model are α1,..., α7 with eit as an error term. Following 
the theory, the hypothesis to be tested are α2>0, α3<0, α4>0, α5>0, α6>0, and α7<0. 
The sample data covers the number of immigrants coming to Russia from the CIS states, constant 
GDP per capita in USD, the distance values in kilometers, unemployment rates and the stock of 
immigrants in Russia. The sources of the data for GDP and unemployment are the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook databases. The 
data for migration flows come from the Russian Statistical Yearbook for 1995-2006. The distance values 
between the pairs of capital cities of countries are calculated using a software tool available on the 
website http://.indo.com/distance. Capital cities are used because they are assumed to be the main 
destination and receiving centers of countries. Since any sort of destabilization including political 
instability, which can vary from one country to another, causes GDP to fall, the standard deviation (SD) 
of GDP growth rates that is calculated across all the CIS countries at every t is used as a proxy for the 
uncertainty measure. Thus, the uncertainty dummy variable is defined as D1=1 if standard deviation of 
GDP growth rates across the member states exceeds the median level (SD>SDmedian) and D1=0 if 
otherwise. The relationship between this measure and migration flows is shown in Figure 5. The second 
dummy, D2, is equal to 1 if policies towards migration are restrictive in Russia and 0 otherwise.  
The equation specified in expression (1) is estimated on a pooled data set for 1995-2005. A 
standard ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is used since it allows one to estimate the independent 
effect of an each factor, while holding constant other variables included. The results of the estimations on 
the pooled data covering 99 observations are demonstrated in Table 5. The basic model variables 
including GDP, population, unemployment and distance have the expected signs. Namely, with an 
increase in the ratio of GDP per capita and the stock of migrants in receiving countries, migration flows 
between countries increase and with the increase of the distance between the countries, migration flows 
decrease. Unemployment levels are not significant statistically which is in line with earlier findings 
reporting no statistical relationship between migration and the level of unemployment (Memedovic et al. 
1995). As for the impact of uncertainty, the sign is positive and highly significant suggesting that, under 
general uncertainty in the CIS, immigration to Russia consistently increases by about 79% (the exponent 
of the coefficient on the dummy variable [0.58] is 1.79). On the contrary, restrictions towards 
immigration in Russia consistently decrease the inflow of immigrants by about 2 times. The equation 
under this specification explains about 71% of the variation in the migration flows from CIS to Russia. 
 The assessment of the immigration potential to Russia from the CIS countries requires a number 
of assumptions to be made in order to reflect future differences in economic and political climate, policies 
and reform progress. Based on the assumptions of GDP per capita ratios, the standard deviation of GDP 
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growth rates across countries and possible development of migration policies in Russia, three scenarios 
are suggested below for the horizon from 2006 to 2025.  
Scenario 1: Optimistic scenario 
Since 1999 the president of Russia has repeatedly asserted that Russia needs 8% annual growth 
for 15 years in order to enter the group of strong, economically advanced and influential states of the 
world and, therefore, regain the regional position of a great power. In 2005, the president of Kazakhstan 
also set the goal for the country to develop into one of the 50 most highly industrialized economies in the 
world. Given these goals, the optimistic scenario assumes that by 2025 the major receivers of migrants in 
the CIS (e.g. Russia and Kazakhstan) will catch up with the 50 highly industrialized countries in the 
world, by reducing substantially their dependence on exports of basic commodities (e.g. oil, mineral and 
energy resources). Furthermore, differences in the economic growth rates and incomes differentials 
among the CIS countries are assumed to increase. This is because in highly indebted CIS countries (e.g. 
Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan), with less favorable positions in terms of natural 
resources endowment and geography, investment from abroad will not be high enough to ensure rapid 
progress. In addition, the exports of these countries will be small due to low productivity and poor quality 
standards. Therefore, they are assumed to develop, in terms of GDP per capita, up to the below-than-
average level of lower-middle income countries. This scenario, consequently, assumes a divergence in per 
capita incomes among the CIS countries, so that migration pressure will persist over time.  
For assessing the migration potential under this scenario, GDP per capita in Russia is assumed to 
grow at a constant annual rate of 9%, in Kazakhstan at 10%, and in the rest of the countries at the range of 
2.5%-8%. Unemployment rates are assumed to stabilize at the level of 7% in 2010 and remain constant 
thereafter.19 The predicted immigration flows for the period from 2006 to 2025 is about 6.72 mln. 
Imposing policy restrictions by Russia towards immigration would largely reduce the estimated potential 
to 3.25 mln., which means that roughly 3.48 mln. would look for alternative destinations, most likely, 
outside the CIS. Under the assumption of increased economic and political uncertainty in the CIS, the 
estimated potential of migration to Russia would increase from 6.72 mln. to 11.99 mln. and to other 
countries from 3.48 mln. to 8.52 mln.       
Scenario 2: Status-quo 
 We assume that the political and economic situation in the CIS is equivalent to the present in 
terms of socio-economic and policy development. The GDP per capita values in all countries are assumed 
to grow at a 6-year average (2000-2006). The assumed growth rate in Russia is 7%, in Kazakhstan is 10% 
                                                 
19The unemployment forecasts are drawn from “Employment and Fiscal Policy Implications of Ageing in Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia”, Background note by the UNECE secretariat. The  
International Labor Organization (http://laborsta.ilo.org). 
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and in the rest of the countries it ranges between 4% (Uzbekistan) and 15% (Azerbaijan). The 
unemployment rates are assumed to stay constant at the 2006 level. The estimated migration potential 
under these assumptions is 6.68 mln. Under increased uncertainty, the potential migration flows increase 
to 13.18 mln. and restrictive policies towards migration reduce it to 3.23 mln.  
Scenario 3: Pessimistic scenario 
  Under the pessimistic scenario, no catching up will take place since the economies of Kazakhstan 
and Russia are not organized like those of 50 developed countries, which are based on the competitive 
conditions of free market economies. For example, the service, manufacturing and industrial sectors in 
Kazakhstan and Russia are relatively underdeveloped compared to highly-industrialized Western 
countries. Besides, the exports of Kazakhstan and Russia are composed of predominantly basic exportable 
goods (e.g. oil and mineral resources). Therefore, under this scenario, international oil prices and the real 
exchange rate would continue to play major roles in the Russian and Kazakh economies. Due to high 
dependence on the basic exportable commodities, fluctuations in growth in these countries would be wide 
with the symptoms of Dutch decease which would eventually depress the average GDP growth rates 
intensified by political economy considerations. This scenario, therefore, assumes convergence in per 
capita incomes among the CIS countries. The potential migration estimated under this scenario is roughly 
6.68 mln., which goes down to 3.23 mln. under migration restrictions and increases by 4.11 mln., 
reaching 10.79 mln, under increased uncertainty in the CIS. In other words, under restrictive policies in 
Russia towards immigration, about 3.45 mln. would look for potential destination either in the CIS or 
other countries outside the CIS.       
 Potential destination countries in the CIS will probably be open for immigrants given their 
demographic conditions and migration policies. Consequently, under uncertainty consideration, which is 
highly probable in light of recent political development, one can expect that roughly 10.79 mln. 
(convergence), 11.99 mln. (divergence) and 13.18 mln.(status quo) would migrate to Russia under the 
above mentioned three scenarios. Since, the number of potential return migrants is larger than the 
estimated potential to Russia, there is a room for emigration flows from the CIS to the rest of the world, 
which will depend on the openness of potential receiving countries.   
c) Emigration potential from the CIS to Europe 
The above-mentioned sections suggest that the most favorite destination for the former SU and, 
lately, CIS emigrants were Europe and US in the 20th century. With the enlargement of EU, Central 
Europe became an important destination too. According to official sources, about 400-450 thousand 
migrants from the CIS, mostly from its European part, worked legally and illegally in Central Europe, 
especially, in the Czech Republic and Poland in 2005.20 In this respect, the European Neighborhood 
                                                 
20The Czech and Polish Statistical Yearbooks, 1995-2005.  
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Policy (ENP) implemented with the recent enlargement of EU stresses the problem of illegal migration. In 
particular, the ENP emphasizes the importance of legitimate travel “for business, educational, tourism and 
official purposes” once the proper preconditions in the neighboring countries are met and increased 
cooperation with other countries in fighting against illegal migration.21 The core elements of the ENP 
would include, consequently, educational and youth exchange, mobility of researchers, civil society 
exchanges, business-to business contacts, etc.    
The ENP action plans suggest that the level of skills and education would be the major 
determinants of migration from the CIS to Europe, at least in intermediate term. Consequently, one can 
expect that migrants with higher skills and better education in the CIS would most likely emigrate, 
especially, from the European part of the CIS where the concentration of scientific centers is higher than 
in other regions. In this respect, the potential migration outflows from the CIS obtained from the gravity 
estimates are adjusted by the size of population with tertiary education.  
The assessment of potential emigration flows from CIS is based on long-run coefficients obtained 
from the estimation results reported in Fertig (2001). The underlying intuition behind this is that in the 
long-run, migration will be driven by economic factors. The approach used by Fertig (2001) allows one to 
determine the driving forces of the past immigration flows to Europe using a well-established model22 that 
distinguishes between short-term and long-term factors influencing migration flows. Namely, using the 
pooled data covering 17 countries for the period from 1960 to 1994, the author derived long-run 
coefficients for major determinants which were further used for forecasting the immigration potential 
from EE to Germany. The explanatory variables, long-run coefficients and t-values obtained in Fertig 
(2001) are presented in Table 6 (Appendix 1). Fertig (2001) used three sets of assumptions to predict the 
future migration flows for the period from 1994 to 2015 based on these coefficients. Under the first two 
assumptions, referred as “medium convergence scenario with and without free movement”, the annual 
per-capita income in Germany grows at a constant rate of 2% leading to a decrease in the income gap 
between Germany and EE at a rate of 2% per annum. Unemployment rate in Germany is set at 8.6% per 
annum. Under the “no convergence with free movement” assumption, the rate of per capita income in 
Germany is set at 2%, while unemployment rate is at 5% per annum.  
The potential for emigration from CIS to Germany based on these coefficients and three set of 
assumptions is calculated for the horizon of 2006 to 2025. Under the first scenario, in which difference in 
GDP per capita between CIS and Germany is assumed to decline at a rate of 2% per year, the estimated 
emigration potential is about 1.25 mln. Under the second scenario, in which difference in GDP per capita 
                                                 
21“Communication from the commission to the council and the European Parliament: On strengthening the 
European Neighborhood Policy” (Commission of the European Communities 2006).   
22The model is formulated in the framework of individual utility maximization and explicitly accounts for 
uncertainty in the migration decision and the formation of expectations regarding the future income of potential 
migrants.    
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between CIS and Germany is assumed to increase by about 1% per annum, the predicted value of 
migration potential increases to 1.27 mln. In the third scenario, the average growth of GDP per capita in 
CIS countries is assumed to grow at a constant rate of 8% leading to the decline of income difference 
between countries by about 6% per annum (a five year average for 2001-2006), which gives roughly 1.25 
mln.  These predicted numbers were used to obtain the approximate emigration potential of CIS to 
Western Europe using the average weighted size of past emigration flows (Table 7, Appendix 1).  
Given the above-mentioned results, migration flows from the CIS to Western and Central Europe 
might include the following components. First, emigration for ethnic reasons consisting primarily of 
national and religious groups with roughly 1 mln. for the period from 2006 to 2025. Second, return 
migration of large ethnic groups, particularly, Russians who prefer to leave the CIS states with new 
official languages and national majorities either for Russia or West, depending on situation in Russia and 
other CIS countries. Third, the potential emigration to Germany and Europe for economic reasons, which 
is obtained on the long-term coefficients, is equal to 1.26 mln. and 2.69 mln., respectively. These results 
are close to those obtained from the gravity model (Table 8, Appendix1).  
   
6. Demographic consequences of migrations for some CIS countries 
Numerous CIS countries are advanced in the ageing process, as presented in Figure 1 (Appendix 
2) and are already suffering from a declining population. From this point of view, migrations could 
modify the age structure of the population, positively or negatively, according to the status of each 
country (receiving or losing workers). To evaluate the consequences of migration from a demographic 
perspective, we present population evolution based on different migratory scenarios for selected CIS 
countries: Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. These countries have been chosen regarding their size and the 
relative importance of migratory flows to illustrate how reasonable migration flows modify the population 
size and structure. The choice of these three countries as an illustration is justified by two main reasons. 
First, these are the largest countries in term of population in the CIS with overall population of more than 
200 mln. people (Table 4, Appendix 1). Seconds, demographic, economic, political and migration 
situation is largely differ from one country to another. 
The methodology used for analyzing the demographic consequences of migration flows in this 
study consists of the following. We alter the population cohorts by sex and by age with three components 
of demographic change: fertility, mortality and net migrations. The starting point is the population 
structure by age and sex taken for a given year (i.e. 2005). Then, by applying survival probabilities 
according to age and sex, we estimate the surviving population of the following year. At the same time, 
the female fertility rate is applied to calculate the number of births expected during this interval. Lastly, 
the migratory surplus by sex and by age is added to the number of survivors at the end of the year. These 
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operations are iterated with a five-year-interval until the last year, included to the forecast period (the year 
of 2050). Consequently, the projection starts with the age pyramid of three countries built for 2005. The 
values of initial indicators are based on the United-Nations data which are presented in Table 9 (Appendix 
1). In 2005, the total fertility rate is equal to 1.34 for Russia, 1.22 for Ukraine, and 2.49 for Uzbekistan. 
Life expectancy is respectively of 59.0 and 72.6 for men and women in Russia, 62.1 and 73.8 in Ukraine 
and 64.0 and 70.4 in Uzbekistan. 
The values retained for the projection (target values in Table 9) are also those of the United-
Nations. Total fertility in all countries is assumed to converge eventually towards the level of 1.85 
children per woman, except for countries where the total fertility rate was far below 1.85 children per 
woman in 2000-2005 (Russia and Ukraine). Mortality is projected on the basis of models capturing the 
change of life expectancy produced by the United Nations Population Division. According to these 
models, the higher the life expectancy reached the smaller the gains are. 
Concerning the net migration flows, we incorporate as an input numbers the results presented in 
Section 5 for each of the three retained countries. As it is mentioned in the above-mentioned sections, 
three population groups are considered. The first group includes emigration for ethnic reasons 
(nationalities which have ethnic ties with other countries) that will take place, most likely, irrespective of 
socio-economic and political situation in the CIS, if they are attracted by foreign countries. The second 
group includes new ethnic minorities which appeared after the establishment of independent CIS states. 
Their migration potential to Russia will depend more on socio-economic and political situation in the 
CIS, as well as the Russian politics. The third group concerns emigration potential from the CIS to 
Western Europe. The assessment of this potential emigration flow is based on the underlying intuition 
that long-run migration perspectives will be driven by economic factors. Note that for each country 
considered, we only consider migration flows to Russia and Western Europe (Table 10, Appendix 1) 
consisting of three countries. By comparison, Table 9 presents the net migration flows retained in the 
recent population projections of the United-Nations. 
We present here demographic results related to three migratory flows assumptions: 
1. A “no migration” scenario (benchmark) which exactly correspond to the United-Nation “zero 
migration” variant 
2. A “high migration” scenario which corresponds to the status quo assumption in term of 
convergence as well as with the assumption of increase uncertainty 
3. A “low migration” scenario which corresponds to the status quo assumption in term of 
convergence as well as without policy and uncertainty impact. 
Projections results are given in Table 11 to 13 (in Appendix 1) for each of the three countries. 
The first part of each table gives the “No migration” scenario results. Russia and Ukraine are clearly more 
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affected by ageing than Uzbekistan. For example, their total population quickly decreases, by respectively 
27% and 31%, when the other country sees a population increase during the next half century. Note that 
the Russian and Ukrainian situation in term of ageing is highly explained by their total fertility rate which 
is far bellow the generation replacement level of 2.1 children per a woman. At the same time, the working 
age population of these two countries is strongly reduced. 
A usual measure of the degree of ageing is captured through the old age dependency ratio (i.e. the 
ratio of people aged 65+ to people aged 20-64). Again, the situation is totally different by countries. In 
Russia and Ukraine, ageing is largely marked since the old age dependency ratio more than doubles, 
reaching, respectively, 43.4% and 48.6% in 2050 (around two workers for a pensioner). The resulting 
demographic ageing raises numerous issues for pension schemes since the burden of the retirees will 
grow spectacularly during the next years of the century. On the contrary, the values expected in 
Uzbekistan are clearly lower.  
The introduction of migration in our projection model could be analyzed from the angle of ageing 
population. The projected population decline and population ageing will have profound and far reaching 
consequences, forcing Governments to reassess many established economic, social and political policies, 
including those relating to international migration. If retirement ages remain the same as they are today, 
increasing the size of the working age population through international migration (or limiting the 
departure of young people to foreign countries) could be a solution in the short and medium term to 
reduce declines in the potential support ratio. The second part of Table 11 to 13 gives the demographic 
consequences of migration flows in the context of two reasonable scenarios. Only Russia is characterized 
by inflows when the two other countries by the outflows of migrants. 
In the case of the Russian Federation, the contribution of net positive flows is relatively weak 
from a demographic perspective. Indeed, the total population is only by 3.6% higher (1.8% for the second 
scenario) in 2050. The size of the working age population is also slightly higher, but the old age 
dependency ratio is only reduced by 1.4 point in the more optimistic scenario (0.7 point in the other one) 
at the end of the projection period. In fact, the important migration flows that are introduced (varying 
between 134 thous. and 387 thous. migrants per year, according to the year and scenario considered) only 
represent a small fraction of the total population (less than 0.4%) and explain the small demographic 
effect. It implies that only the implementation of an active migratory policy, that increases substantially 
the migration flows in next decades, could justify the use of immigration as one of the important ways to 
replenish population fall in Russia. 
The two other countries are characterized by net migration outflows. In the case of Ukraine which 
will be strongly affected by demographic ageing, introducing migration outflows will increase the 
consequences of ageing though the departure of young people to Russia and Western Europe. However, 
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the simulated flows are sufficiently week (less than 0.25% of the population) not to destabilize the age 
pyramid in a catastrophic way. So, the old age dependency ratio is only 0.9 point higher in the more 
optimistic migratory scenario. 
As previously seen, Uzbekistan is in a situation totally different from the other countries since its 
total population (as well as its working age population) still increases on the next half century without 
migration. Net migratory outflows are of the same scale of sizes as Ukraine so that the demographic 
consequences are also very week. However, given the vitality of the fertility behavior, only the size of the 
population is really affected since the age structure of the population is relatively stable. 
To conclude, further demographic ageing is inevitable over the next decades even if the three 
countries are not similarly affected. Indeed, the dependency ratio, or the ratio of retirees to the working 
population, should double. The study also shows that reasonable migratory flows – economically 
motivated - will have no significant impact on these trends unless if they become substantial. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper reviews the evidence of migration flows from and within the CIS countries, focusing 
on large migration flows, region specific issues and policies implemented by the major receiving 
countries. Based on this, possible migration scenarios for the horizon of 2006-2025 are proposed for the 
two different groups of potential migrants. The first group includes ethnicities which have close ties with 
countries or large diasporas abroad. The second group includes new ethnic minorities which appeared 
with the collapse of the former SU and establishment of independent CIS states. Assuming that the first 
group of potential migrants would leave the CIS irrespective of its socio-economic and political situation 
(i.e. the formation of the expected emigration flows follows a geometric series of the past values), the size 
of potential emigration is obtained at about 1 mln. For the second group of return migrants in the CIS, on 
the contrary, the socio-economic and political situation in the major receiving countries (i.e. Russia and 
Kazakhstan) will presumably play an important role. In this respect, the gravity model is used for 
obtaining the estimates.  
Three scenarios proposed in the model are as follows. Under the optimistic case, which assumes a 
catching up process with the 50 most highly industrialized countries in the world, migration pressure will 
persist over time with the estimated size of 6.72 mln. It declines to 3.25 mln. under policy restrictions in 
Russia and increases to 11.99 mln. with general economic and political instability in the CIS. Under the 
status-quo scenario, the estimated potential is estimated at about 6.68 mln., 3.23 mln. and 13.18 mln., 
correspondingly. Under the third, pessimistic scenario, which assumes no catching-up process, the 
potential size of migration is roughly 6.68 mln., which goes down to 3.23 mln. under policy restrictions in 
Russia and increases by 4.11 mln., under increased uncertainty in the CIS. Assuming further that potential 
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destination countries in the CIS (i.e. Russia and Kazakhstan) will be open for immigrants, one can expect 
that roughly 10.79 mln. (under convergence), 11.99 mln. (under divergence) and 13.18 mln. (under status 
quo) would migrate to Russia. The potential migration to the Western European countries is much lower 
than that of within the CIS (2.69 mln.). 
Based on different migratory scenarios, the consequences of migration are evaluated in terms of 
demographic perspective as well, in selected CIS countries. These countries are Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan which are the largest CIS members in term of population (with more than 200 
mln. people in overall) and differ in terms of demographic, economic, political and migration situation. 
Our results suggest that further demographic ageing is inevitable over the next decades even if these three 
countries are not similarly affected. Indeed, the dependency ratio, or the ratio of retirees to the working 
population, should double. The study also shows that reasonable migratory flows - economically 
motivated - will have no significant impact on these trends unless if they become substantial. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table 1. National composition of the former SU (mln. people) 
Percentage changes 
 Major ethnic groups 1959 1970 1979 1989-1991 1999-2002 Between 1959 
and 1979  
Between 1989 
and 2002  
1 Russians  114.0 129.0 137.0 144.6 134.1 20.2 -7.3 
2 Ukrainians 37.0 40.0 42.0 43.3 41.5 13.5 -4.3 
3 Byelorussians  6.0 9.0 9.5 8.7 8.7 58.3 -0.5 
4 Uzbeks 6.0 9.2 12.5 15.7 20.2 108.3 28.4 
5 Kazakhs 4.0 5.2 6.6 7.7 9.4 65.0 21.3 
6 Tatars 5.0 5.9 6.3 5.5 5.6 26.0 1.8 
7 Tadjiks 1.4 2.3 2.8 4.1 6.1 100.0 47.3 
8 Turkmens 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.5 4.4 100.0 25.7 
9 Kyrgyz 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.3 3.1 111.1 34.8 
10 Azerbaijanis 2.9 4.4 5.5 6.1 7.6 89.7 24.8 
11 Armenians 2.8 3.5 4.1 4.0 3.9 46.4 -2.5 
12 Georgians 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.6 29.6 -5.3 
13 Moldavians 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.0 31.8 7.2 
14 Lithuanians 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 21.7 0.0 
15 Latvians 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 
16 Estonians 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 11.1 -3.4 
17 Germans 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.5 0.8 18.8 -50.0 
18 Jews 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.4 0.4 -21.7 -76.2 
19 Chuvash 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.2 1.1 20.0 -8.3 
20 Dagestans 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 77.8 5.6 
21 Bashkirs 0.9 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.1 55.6 22.2 
22 Mordvinians 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.6 -15.4 -14.3 
23 Poles 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.2 -14.3 -8.9 
Sources: Pockney (1991); Mansoor and Quillin (2007) 
Table 2. Migration flow to and from Russia  
    
 1980 1985 1990-2000 2001-2005 1980 1985 1990-2000 2001-2005
 thousands percent 
Immigration  876 877 7,925 913 100 100 100 100 
CIS 841 847 7,561 880 95.95 96.54 95.40 94.25 
Other countries 35 30 347 33 4.05 3.46 4.37 5.75 
Emigration  781 705 4,333 729 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
CIS 733 666 3,228 605 93.91 94.44 74.51 49.39 
Other major 
countries, 
including: 48 39 1,093 123 6.09 5.56 25.23 50.61 
Germany 1 0 600 34 0.17 0.06 13.84 37.37 
Israel 4 1 249 61 0.52 0.09 5.75 2.78 
Latvia 16 15 28 9 2.09 2.14 0.64 0.27 
Lithuania 11 11 26 7 1.36 1.50 0.59 0.28 
The United 
States 0 0 112 2 0.01 0.01 2.59 3.78 
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Estonia 14 10 18 5 1.74 1.48 0.42 0.33 
Net migration between Russia and other CIS states 
Total 108 181 4,332 524 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Azerbaijan 12 20 351 14 11.36 10.85 8.10 2.75 
Armenia 5 9 201 24 4.98 5.16 4.65 4.49 
Belarus 6 2 -3 -8 5.30 0.96 -0.07 -1.45 
Georgia 10 13 373 28 9.15 7.18 8.62 5.35 
Kazakhstan 34 70 1,552 174 31.92 38.71 35.82 33.27 
Kyrgyzstan 7 9 294 51 6.43 4.73 6.79 9.81 
Moldova 3 3 79 27 2.48 1.91 1.83 5.14 
Tajikistan 5 7 355 22 4.53 3.67 8.19 4.27 
Turkmenistan 4 6 121 22 3.44 3.34 2.80 4.18 
Uzbekistan 11 16 671 111 10.47 9.07 15.48 21.14 
Ukraine 11 26 337 58 9.94 14.44 7.79 11.07 
 Source: State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics: Russia in Figures, 1990-2005 
 
Table 3. Forced migration flows to Russia (% of total)  
Regions/countries 
of origin 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Regions of Russia  14 17 9 13 12 12 12 16 11 6 9 35 94 
European part  6 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Moldova 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Baltic States 0 2 4 3 4 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Caucasia 36 39 14 9 10 6 5 8 7 15 55 45 1 
Azerbaijan 20 15 5 5 5 4 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 
Armenia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 15 23 7 4 4 2 3 7 7 14 54 44 1 
Central Asia 44 40 72 73 71 76 80 73 79 77 34 18 5 
Kazakhstan 0 3 25 33 36 49 61 49 53 47 18 8 3 
Kyrgyzstan 1 7 13 7 5 3 2 2 3 4 2 1 0 
Tajikistan 41 24 10 10 12 10 6 6 4 5 5 4 1 
Turkmenistan 0 0 1 2 4 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Uzbekistan 2 6 23 22 14 10 10 16 19 20 9 5 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Source: State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics: Russia in Figures, 1990-2005 
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Table 4. CIS economic indicators for 2006  
Countries Population GDP Inflation 
Current 
account 
balance 
 
Total, 
mln. 
people 
Annual 
growth,  % 
Urban, % 
of total 
Annual 
growth 
rate,  % 
Per capita  
(PPP, 
constant) 
in USD 
Annual 
rate,  % mln.USD 
Armenia 3.4 2.3 64.3 13.4 4 515.6 3.0 -254.0 
Azerbaijan 8.5 0.8 50.0 34.5 5 895.3 8.0 167.3* 
Belarus 9.7 -0.4 72.8 9.9  7.0 -1 511.6 
Georgia 4.4 1.8 51.7 8.6 3 755.5 8.0 -1 243.4 
Kazakhstan 15.1 0.1 55.9 10.6 9 133.7 8.6 -724.0* 
Kyrgyzstan 5.2 1.1 33.9 2.7 2 224.4 5.6 -228.2 
Moldova 3.4 0.0 46.2 4.0 2 707.6 13.0 -263.7* 
Russia 142.2 -0.4 73.3 6.7 11 904.3 9.7 94 466.6 
Tajikistan 6.4 0.6 24.5 7.0 1 506.3 12.0 -18.86* 
Turkmenistan 5.1 1.6 45.6 8.7 8 663.6 - - 
Ukraine 46.6 -0.7 67.3 7.0 7 816.2 9.1 2531* 
Uzbekistan 26.6 1.3 36.5 7.3 1 983.1 9.0 - 
Source: National statistical agencies, International Financial Statistics (*-data for 2005) 
Table 5. Estimation results  
 
Regression: 
ln(Mijt)=α1+α2ln (Yjt/Yit) + α3ln(Kij)+ α4 ln(Ujt/Uit)+ α5ln(Sit)+ α6D1+ α7D2+eit. 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
Trade flows from country i to country j at time t ln(Mijt) 
Independent variables: 
Coefficients 
Constant term C α1 
-3.30 
     (1.21)** 
GDP per capitaj/GDP per capitai ln(Yjt/Yit) α2 
0.17 
      (0.12)*** 
Distance between the capital cities of countries i 
and j 
ln (Kij) α3 
-0.53 
       (0.27)**   
Unemploymentj/Unemploymenti Ln(Uj/Ui) α 4 
0.08 
 (0.11) 
The stock of migrants ln(Sit) α5 
1.09 
   (0.10)*  
Uncertainty measure  D1 α6 
0.58 
   (0.13)* 
Migration restrictions in Russia  D2 α7 
-0.73 
    (0.11)*  
Number of observations  99 
Adjusted R-squared  0.71 
White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors: *,**,*** define 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, 
respectively 
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Table 6. Long-run coefficients  
Explanatory Variable Long-Run Coefficient t-value 
Per capita income ratio 0.00012 2.43 
German employment rate 0.00027 2.39 
Employment rate of home countries  -0.00049 -3.94 
Stock of Migrants*1,000,000 -0.00034 -1.80 
“Free Movement” Dummy23 0.00038 3.12 
Source: Fertig (2001) 
 
Table 7.  Migration flows predicted using a Fertig's model (i.e. without policy and uncertainty assumptions in CIS), 
in thousands 
Scenarios Destination countries 2006-2010 
2011-
2015 
2016-
2020 
2021-
2025 
2006-
2025 
Western Europe* 778.6 685.8 632.2 596.3 2692.9 
Eastern Europe           
European part of CIS -476.6 -383.8 -332.3 -296.4 -1489.2 
Mediterranean World -302.0 -302.0 -299.8 -299.9 -1203.7 
-Caucasus -40.6 -40.3 -39.8 -39.3 -159.9 
Scenario 1 
(convergence 
between CIS 
and Europe) 
-Central Asia -261.5 -261.7 -260.0 -260.6 -1043.8 
Western Europe* 856.3 761.6 705.6 667.7 2991.2 
Eastern Europe           
European part of CIS -227.4 -152.6 -116.7 -95.5 -592.3 
Mediterranean World -628.8 -609.0 -588.9 -572.1 -2398.9 
Caucasus -202.8 -193.4 -184.6 -176.2 -757.0 
Scenario 2 
(divergence 
between CIS 
and Europe) 
Central Asia -426.1 -415.6 -404.3 -395.9 -1641.9 
Western Europe* 868.9 770.8 711.6 671.3 3022.6 
Eastern Europe           
European part of CIS -646.3 -556.6 -505.3 -472.3 -2180.6 
Mediterranean World -222.6 -214.2 -206.3 -198.9 -842.0 
Caucasus -17.1 -18.1 -19.0 -20.1 -74.3 
Scenario 3 
(status quo) 
Central Asia -205.4 -196.1 -187.2 -178.9 -767.6 
*) These values include emigration for ethnic reasons 
 
 
 
                                                 
23In the assessment of CIS countries’ emigration potential to Europe, a free movement dummy is skipped. 
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Table 8. Migration flows (predicted values are based on the CIS gravity (with policy and uncertainty assumptions), 
in thousands 
Under restrictive immigration policies in Russia and low degree of uncertainty in CIS 
  Destination regions 2006-2010 
2011-
2015 
2016-
2020 
2021-
2025 
2006-
2025 
Western Europe* 475.0 404.5 376.7 362.5 1618.6 
           
European part of CIS -365.1 -283.9 -242.1 -215.3 -1106.5 
Mediterranean World -109.9 -120.6 -134.5 -147.2 -512.2 
Caucasus -12.3 -13.1 -14.8 -13.2 -53.4 
Scenario 1 
(divergence 
within CIS) 
Central Asia -97.6 -107.5 -119.8 -134.0 -458.8 
Western Europe* 466.0 397.3 371.1 358.7 1593.1 
           
European part of CIS -365.9 -286.7 -246.8 -221.8 -1121.3 
Mediterranean World -100.1 -110.6 -124.3 -136.9 -471.8 
Caucasus -12.1 -12.8 -14.4 -12.9 -52.3 
Scenario 2 
(convergence 
within CIS) 
Central Asia -87.9 -97.7 -109.9 -124.0 -419.5 
Western Europe* 465.0 394.3 366.3 352.0 1577.7 
           
European part of CIS -364.7 -283.5 -241.7 -214.9 -1104.9 
Mediterranean World -100.3 -110.8 -124.6 -137.1 -472.8 
Caucasus -12.2 -12.9 -14.5 -13.0 -52.6 
Scenario 3 
(status quo) 
Central Asia -88.1 -97.9 -110.1 -124.1 -420.2 
Under high degree of uncertainty in CIS  
  Destination regions 2006-2010 
2011-
2015 
2016-
2020 
2021-
2025 
2006-
2025 
Western Europe* 542.6 478.5 458.8 451.1 1931.0 
           
European part of CIS -383.4 -303.1 -262.2 -236.4 -1185.2 
Mediterranean World -159.2 -175.4 -196.6 -214.7 -745.9 
Caucasus -18.7 -19.9 -22.4 -19.0 -80.0 
Scenario 1 
(divergence 
within CIS) 
Central Asia -140.5 -155.5 -174.2 -195.7 -665.9 
Western Europe* 490.6 424.2 401.0 392.8 1708.6 
           
European part of CIS -372.6 -293.7 -254.1 -229.4 -1149.7 
Mediterranean World -118.0 -130.5 -146.9 -163.3 -558.9 
Caucasus -14.5 -15.4 -17.3 -17.0 -64.1 
Scenario 2 
(convergence 
within CIS) 
Central Asia -103.6 -115.2 -129.7 -146.4 -494.8 
Western Europe* 579.1 519.1 504.8 505.6 2108.6 
           
European part of CIS -395.6 -315.8 -275.5 -250.4 -1237.3 
Mediterranean World -183.5 -203.3 -229.2 -255.2 -871.3 
Caucasus -22.8 -24.1 -27.1 -26.7 -100.7 
Scenario 3 
(status quo) 
Central Asia -160.8 -179.2 -202.1 -228.6 -770.6 
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Under high degree of uncertainty in CIS and restrictive migration policies in RUSSIA 
  Destination regions 2006-2010 
2011-
2015 
2016-
2020 
2021-
2025 
2006-
2025 
Western Europe 664.3 611.5 606.5 614.9 2497.2 
           
European part of CIS -416.3 -337.5 -298.4 -274.4 -1326.6 
Mediterranean World -247.9 -274.0 -308.1 -340.5 -1170.6 
Caucasus -30.2 -32.1 -36.1 -33.7 -132.1 
Scenario 1 
(divergence 
within CIS) 
Central Asia -217.7 -241.9 -272.0 -306.8 -1038.5 
Western Europe 611.3 556.2 547.5 555.1 2270.0 
           
European part of CIS -405.1 -327.7 -289.8 -266.9 -1289.5 
Mediterranean World -206.2 -228.5 -257.7 -288.2 -980.5 
Caucasus -25.8 -27.4 -30.7 -31.5 -115.4 
Scenario 2 
(convergence 
within CIS) 
Central Asia -180.4 -201.1 -226.9 -256.7 -865.1 
Western Europe 699.8 651.1 651.2 668.1 2670.2 
           
European part of CIS -428.2 -349.9 -311.3 -288.0 -1377.3 
Mediterranean World -271.7 -301.2 -339.9 -380.1 -1292.9 
Caucasus -34.0 -36.1 -40.5 -41.1 -151.8 
Scenario 3 
(status quo) 
Central Asia -237.6 -265.1 -299.4 -339.0 -1141.1 
*) These values include emigration for ethnic reasons 
 
 
Table 9: Assumptions related to the demographic projections 
 
 
Russian Federation Initial indicator 1.34 59.0 72.6 250.00
Target value 1.71 68.5 77.9 250.00
Ukraine Initial indicator 1.22 62.1 73.8 -100.00
Target value 1.59 71.0 79.1 -100.00
Uzbekistan Initial indicator 2.49 64.0 70.4 -200.00
Target value 1.85 71.5 77.2 -100.00
Source: United-Nations (2006) 
Total Fertily 
rate
Men life 
expectancy
Women life 
expectancy 
Net Migratory 
flows
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Table 10: Migration flows computed for demographic projections 
 
 
2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 2021-2025
Russia From CIS 132.5 307.0 334.6 375.0 415.2
To WE -22.1 -26.8 -25.4 -24.1 -22.8
Refugees -18.7 -11.5 -8.0 -5.9
Net flows 110.4 261.6 297.6 342.9 386.6
Ukraine To Russia -18.1 -40.2 -42.3 -44.2 -46.2
To WE -17.5 -21.0 -19.6 -18.3 -17.1
Refugees -14.6 -8.9 -6.1 -4.4
Net flows -35.6 -75.8 -70.8 -68.6 -67.7
Uzbekistan To Russia -29.8 -57.5 -62.6 -73.5 -86.2
To WE -1.8 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2
Refugees -5.3 -3.2 -2.3 -1.7
Net flows -31.6 -64.9 -68.1 -78.0 -90.1
Russia From CIS 132.5 155.5 169.5 190.0 210.3
To WE -22.1 -21.4 -20.4 -19.3 -18.2
Refugees -20.7 -12.8 -8.9 -6.5
Net flows 110.38 134.11 149.17 170.71 192.13
Ukraine To Russia -18.1 -20.4 -21.4 -22.4 -23.4
To WE -17.5 -16.8 -15.7 -14.6 -13.7
Refugees -16.3 -9.9 -6.7 -4.9
Net flows -35.6 -53.4 -47.0 -43.7 -42.0
Uzbekistan To Russia -29.8 -29.1 -31.7 -37.2 -43.7
To WE -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Refugees -16.5 -15.9 -15.2 -14.7
Net flows -31.6 -47.4 -49.4 -54.3 -60.2
Source: Authors' calculation
Scenario 1: Under increased uncertainty + Status-Quo 
Scenario 2: without policy and uncertainty impact 
 33
Table 11: Demographic consequences of migration in the Russian Federation 
 
 
Table 12: Demographic consequences of migration in the Ukraine 
 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
No Migration
Net migration flows (in thousands) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total population 143 953 140 054 131 564 122 449 113 660 105 018
<20 23.5% 20.8% 21.2% 19.9% 18.9% 19.9%
20-65 62.7% 66.6% 63.8% 61.0% 60.5% 55.9%
65+ 13.8% 12.6% 14.9% 19.1% 20.5% 24.2%
65+/20-65 22.0% 18.9% 23.4% 31.3% 33.9% 43.4%
Scenario 1
Net migration flows (in thousands) 262 298 387 387 387 387
Net migration flows (% of population) 0.18% 0.21% 0.29% 0.31% 0.33% 0.36%
Total population 143 953 140 316 132 519 124 309 116 491 108 856
<20 23.5% 20.8% 21.3% 20.0% 19.1% 20.1%
20-65 62.7% 66.6% 63.9% 61.2% 60.7% 56.2%
65+ 13.8% 12.6% 14.8% 18.8% 20.1% 23.6%
65+/20-65 22.0% 18.8% 23.2% 30.8% 33.1% 42.0%
Scenario 2
Net migration flows (in thousands) 134 149 192 192 192 192
Net migration flows (% of population) 0.09% 0.11% 0.15% 0.16% 0.17% 0.18%
Total population 143 953 140 188 132 045 123 380 115 074 106 932
<20 23.5% 20.8% 21.2% 19.9% 19.0% 20.0%
20-65 62.7% 66.6% 63.9% 61.1% 60.6% 56.0%
65+ 13.8% 12.6% 14.9% 19.0% 20.3% 23.9%
65+/20-65 22.0% 18.9% 23.3% 31.0% 33.5% 42.7%
Source: Authors' calculation
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
No Migration
Net migration flows (in thousands) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total population 46 918 45 273 42 004 38 612 35 268 31 984
<20 22.4% 19.8% 18.8% 17.9% 16.8% 17.3%
20-65 61.6% 64.6% 64.1% 61.4% 60.5% 55.6%
65+ 16.1% 15.6% 17.1% 20.7% 22.8% 27.0%
65+/20-65 26.1% 24.1% 26.6% 33.7% 37.6% 48.6%
Scenario 1
Net migration flows (in thousands) -76 -71 -68 -68 -68 -68
Net migration flows (% of population) -0.16% -0.16% -0.16% -0.18% -0.19% -0.22%
Total population 46 918 45 197 41 777 38 231 34 728 31 282
<20 22.4% 19.8% 18.8% 17.8% 16.7% 17.2%
20-65 61.6% 64.6% 64.1% 61.3% 60.3% 55.4%
65+ 16.1% 15.6% 17.2% 20.8% 23.0% 27.4%
65+/20-65 26.1% 24.1% 26.8% 34.0% 38.2% 49.5%
Scenario 2
Net migration flows (in thousands) -36 -53 -44 -44 -44 -44
Net migration flows (% of population) -0.08% -0.12% -0.10% -0.11% -0.13% -0.14%
Total population 46 918 45 237 41 861 38 369 34 922 31 533
<20 22.4% 19.8% 18.8% 17.9% 16.7% 17.3%
20-65 61.6% 64.6% 64.1% 61.4% 60.4% 55.5%
65+ 16.1% 15.6% 17.1% 20.8% 22.9% 27.3%
65+/20-65 26.1% 24.1% 26.7% 33.9% 38.0% 49.2%
Source: Authors' calculation
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Table13: Demographic consequences of migration in the Uzbekistan  
 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
No Migration
Net migration flows (in thousands) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total population 26 593 28 796 32 963 35 940 38 283 39 677
<20 44.9% 40.7% 35.1% 30.3% 26.3% 24.6%
20-65 50.3% 54.9% 59.7% 61.4% 62.9% 61.2%
65+ 4.7% 4.3% 5.2% 8.2% 10.8% 14.2%
65+/20-65 9.4% 7.9% 8.7% 13.4% 17.2% 23.3%
Scenario 1
Net migration flows (in thousands) -65 -68 -90 -90 -90 -90
Net migration flows (% of population) -0.24% -0.24% -0.28% -0.25% -0.24% -0.23%
Total population 26 593 28 731 32 728 35 491 37 604 38 760
<20 44.9% 40.7% 35.2% 30.4% 26.3% 24.6%
20-65 50.3% 54.9% 59.6% 61.4% 62.8% 61.1%
65+ 4.7% 4.4% 5.2% 8.3% 10.9% 14.4%
65+/20-65 9.4% 7.9% 8.7% 13.5% 17.4% 23.5%
Scenario 2
Net migration flows (in thousands) -47 -49 -60 -60 -60 -60
Net migration flows (% of population) -0.18% -0.17% -0.18% -0.17% -0.16% -0.15%
Total population 26 593 28 749 32 794 35 628 37 816 39 051
<20 44.9% 40.7% 35.1% 30.4% 26.3% 24.6%
20-65 50.3% 54.9% 59.7% 61.4% 62.8% 61.1%
65+ 4.7% 4.3% 5.2% 8.3% 10.9% 14.3%
65+/20-65 9.4% 7.9% 8.7% 13.5% 17.4% 23.4%
Source: Authors' calculation
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Appendix 2: Graphs 
-2 3 8 13 18 23 28 33 38 43
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Russian Federation
Belarus
Moldova
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
C
ou
nt
rie
s
Young people aged between 0 and 15, % of total population  
Figure 1. The proportion of young people in population 
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Figure 2. Annual GDP growth rates between 1989 and 2006  
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Figure 3. Emigration from Russia to non-CIS foreign countries between 1980 and 2005 
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Figure 4. Emigration from CIS 
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a) annual migration to/from Russia 
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b) the stock of migrants  
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Figure 5. Migration between Russia and other CIS states  
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